In this paper we describe findings on Situation Awareness (SA) from a field study on decision making in ambulance control, or Emergency Medical Dispatch (EMD). Triangulating the results from observations and Contextual Inquiry interviews of 18 participants, with 13 Critical Decision Methods in-depth interviews, we found, among other things, that EMD work can be classified as routine operations, start of a major incident, and when an incident is established. Higher levels of SA were exhibited by dispatchers for non-routine or major incidents, than for routine events. Senior dispatchers, or allocators, developed a "picture in the head" of the situation, and used that to plan ahead and to evaluate their plans. They were also found to use an information hub strategy to develop and maintain their SA. Using a combined Wickens (2000) and Endsley (1995) framework, we see allocators interleaving their attention and information handling between routine and major incidents.
INTRODUCTION
Situation Awareness, SA, plays a vital role in dynamic decision making environments such as ambulance control, more formally known as Emergency Medical Dispatch (EMD). Primarily, EMD is concerned with the reception of calls for medical assistance and the dispatching and control of ambulances (Clawson & Dernocoeur, 1998) . To do their jobs effectively, ambulance dispatchers must be able to adequately perceive and comprehend dynamically changing information about the tasks being controlled and the systems used to control them, and to project ahead what the situation and the external environment might be in order to anticipate and take appropriate actions (Endsley, 1995; Wickens, 2000) .
Understanding the nature of SA is necessary for designing better control systems and information displays. Much of the previous research in SA has been in other dynamic environments such as aviation and air traffic control; this study extends that body of research to the domain of emergency ambulance control rooms. In this paper we report on a field study conducted at one of Europe's largest and busiest emergency ambulance control centres. Although the study was originally planned to investigate decision making in dynamic environments, a number of SA concepts emerged during the study and they will be the focus of this paper. Different aspects of this research have been reported elsewhere Blandford, Wong, Connell, & Green, 2002; .
The ambulance control centre studied is responsible for more than 400 ambulances, rapid response vehicles and helicopters, deployed over 70 stations in an area of about 1600 square kilometres of urban and sub-urban terrain with a population of over 7 million people. The control centre receives over 3500 calls a day for emergency medical assistance. It is organised into two sections. The first section has workstations for 22 calltakers, and the second section is organised into seven sector desks of three dispatchers each, comprising a sector controller or allocator who is responsible for all ambulance operations in that sector, a radio operator who communicates with ambulance crews that are on the road, and a telephone dispatcher who communicates with crews at their stations or other emergency services; there are two other specialist desks for dispatching and controlling rapid response vehicles and the helicopters.
METHOD
The field study combined a number of different approaches which we used to triangulate our understanding of situation awareness and decision making. We conducted interviews with key senior managers, had familiarisation visits to the control room, and studied operating procedure documents. This set the stage for access to staff in the control room, and for understanding current practices.
We also analysed 358,866 daily call records to assess dispatch performance. The records were from the 4 month period prior to the study. We focussed on the relationship between activation times and workload as an indicator of the information handling capacity of individual dispatchers and the control centre overall. Activation time refers to the time taken to assess, decide and instruct ambulance crews of the emergency to which they are to respond.
A series of eighteen 60-90 minute observations and Contextual Inquiry interviews (Beyer & Holtzblatt, 1999) were conducted involving four allocators, five call-takers, four radio operators, and two other specialist dispatch. These observations were held in-situ, at the actual workstations of the dispatchers. We observed routine operations and information handling activities. When workload permitted, participants were asked to explain why things were done in a particular way. Although the control room setting was a useful context for inquiring how actual work is done, workload levels meant that interviews were frequently interrupted so it was not possible to engage deeply in any issue.
Another series of in-depth, 60-80 minute interviews using the Critical Decision Method, CDM (Hoffman, Crandall, & Shadbolt, 1998) was conducted with 13 other dispatchers. However the results of only six allocators, and three radio operators who worked as allocators when allocators were on breaks, will be discussed in this study. The other four dispatchers were more junior and their lack of experience was reflected in the interviews. The CDM is a retrospective protocol analysis technique that requires participants to think back to a particularly memorable incident they have experienced in the course of their work. These incidents were used as a basis for extracting various aspects of their expertise, including the considerations made, cues attended and decision strategies invoked.
The interviews and hand written notes about nonverbalisable actions were transcribed, and then analysed using the Emergent Themes Analysis approach . The ETA is a concept distillation technique for systematically allowing concepts to emerge from the data set; and then from these concepts to provide a structure for subsequent analysis. Excerpts from the different interviews and observation notes are extracted from individual transcripts, which are then collated across transcripts to reveal themes. The excerpts can then be further analysed to identify the activities, cues attended during their participation in that activity during the incident, the knowledge they had brought to bear on the activity, and the difficulties they had experienced in performing that activity. Decision strategies can then be derived from this analysis, and interpreted within context to provide insights to the nature of the processes being studies. However, for space reasons, we will only use single excerpts to illustrate the themes or features identified about SA.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Workload and Information Handling Capacity Limits
The analysis of dispatch performance showed that the time taken by the dispatchers to activate ambulances occurred in two performance bands that correspond with a low workload level of 29-91 calls per hour, and a high workload level of 105-156 calls per hour. The mean activation time that occurs during the high workload band is 3 min 38 sec, and is nearly twice that of the mean activation time of 2 min 8 sec that occurs during the low workload band. This difference was significant (t-test, p<0,05) and is charted in Figure 1 . Similar performance patterns have been observed elsewhere (Hayes, 2002) , suggesting some information handling capacity limit has been breached. While this has to be investigated further, the results suggest that the information processing systems -both technological as well as cognitive, perhaps -are unable to cope with the demands of the higher levels of workload. As we breach the capacity limit, it will no longer be possible to pay equal attention to all the information presented in order to keep track of events and make sense of them. The subsequent studies show that indeed dispatchers do not attend to all events with equal emphasis. This could be because the dispatchers need more time, which is relatively unavailable under high workload conditions, and more effort to locate desired information, e.g. more scrolling or accessing necessary related information that is distributed across different screens. Therefore, in order to cope with the higher workload demands, they are selective about which events they keep closer track of. Typically these are of the nonroutine, major incident type of events, that will be discussed further later in this paper.
Phases of EMD Work
Results from our observation, Contextual Inquiry and CDM interview studies suggests that EMD work can be classified into three broad phases: (i) routine operations; (ii) start of major incidents; and (iii) major incident declared. These phases are described next.
Routine operations. During routine work, allocators typically control between 25 to 37 ambulances simultaneously. Allocators were observed not to pay much attention to each individual ambulance or incident once the initial decision about which resource to send has been made. Instead, they focussed very much more on the overall deployment of their vehicles.
Start of major incident. The start of a major incident, such as a train crash with multiple casualties, is a transition time of very high workload. Allocators need to verify information and re-assess incident severity and requirements, while ensuring adequate ambulance coverage in the rest of the sector. As the incidents develop and are confirmed, they are then declared as major incidents.
Major incident declared. Once the incident is considered significant and assessed as not a 'false alarm', a separate dispatch team is set up and the incident is physically transferred from the sector desk to a dedicated control room.
Keeping track of events during routine operations
The following sections will describe our observations of SA during these phases of EMD. We will use excerpts from participants of the Contextual Inquiry study, indicated as C1, C2 …, and from participants from the CDM interviews, indicated as D1, D2 … , to illustrate the points about SA in EMD. In the extracts, 'I' is the interviewer.
SA was observed to be selective. In one example, the allocator was generally aware when notified that an ambulance had become available after dropping off a patient at a hospital. Several minutes later, the allocator focussing attention to the ambulance in relation to a new incident, decided to re-direct it to the incident, given their understanding of the overall local situation. […] it's just by judgement of knowing your areas.
Besides being selective about which incidents or ambulances they have a good awareness about, allocators also indicate that they often keep a loose track of routine incidents and resource distribution, maintaining only a partial awareness of the general situation:
C7: I can't remember every single call that everyone is on, but sometimes you get a call through, not all the time because you sometimes forget you've sent a crew, but most of the time you think 'oh that rings a bell', […] you can't remember every single address, there's just too many all day.
Overall, the degree of SA maintained by allocators seem to vary according to the need to perform their jobs at a particular time. This includes a minimal level of SA once a job has been assigned; a partial SA of resource availability; and a selective SA when the circumstances become relevant to a situation. What allocators appear to do is to regularly shift their attention from the overall sector's use of resources, incidents and needs, to specific incidents as the situation demands. This is graphically described by one allocator: D4: Well, you have to look, you just have to keep looking, scanning through if there's a different call coming in, from a different area, then you just treat it as a normal call and dispatch somebody, and you're all the time trying to keep an eye on what's building up on your own, on the other, on the um, the major incident.
Allocators were also observed to often rely on subtle cues to make sense of situational information. This has been referred to by others as '6 th sense'. You go there and they say send another ambulance, and we say there's one on the way for you.
"Picture in the head"
Six of the nine allocators interviewed in the CDM use the term "picture" or "picture in the head" to describe their understanding of the situation, especially during major incidents, for example:
D1: … we just try and picture everything … everything has to be a picture in your head of what's going on.
The analysis suggests that there are two senses in which the term 'picture' is used, firstly the situation at the scene:
D6: … really, you get a mental picture don't ya … because you can just imagine a swimming pool with lots of kids walking around, ambulances, and people collapsing around.
We also observed that the more senior or experienced dispatchers were, the more likely they were to create a mental 'picture' of what was happening at an incident. C8, a senior call-taker describes the development of this picture, while none of the less experienced call-takers did.
C8: So she's inside and she's fallen down, but she can hear them outside, and she's saying she can't open the door. It's not like she's in there dead or anything -they know she's alive and breathing but they don't know what she's done. I: The lady on the phone didn't quite say all that, you sort of pieced them all together? C8: Yeah, well she said she could hear her, the lady inside had said that she couldn't get up to open the door, so she's obviously conscious and breathing and she's probably hurt herself in some way because she can't get up.
The second sense of 'picture' is as a mental map of the area in the vicinity of the scene: This mental map of the area and how the ambulances can move around the area is used for developing, rehearsing and evaluating a plan, D7: … you gotta have roughly a picture in your head on what you're going to do, how you're going to do it...deal with it, and where you're gonna send your resources to get the best access to the patients without endangering the crews and also be able to get them out as well safely, the patients.
This picture is important as it allows them to anticipate and prepare to take other actions: This mental picture is an outcome of SA and they use it to consider how the incident might eventuate and therefore make plans for it. The picture is used as a visualisation of: (i) the overall situation; (ii) events at the scene which helps them develop "… a picture of what else they need …" so they can anticipate "… what more we can be doing." (D1); and (iii) a mental map of the area overlaid with dynamic information about an incident that is used to help them plan ahead, identify issues, assess resource availability (hospital spaces, nearest ambulances), and evaluate ingress and egress routes to a major incident. (2000) and Endsley's (1995) definitions of SA to EMD; R = routine incidents, M = major incidents .
The Information Hub Strategy
Allocators develop and maintain SA by acting as information hubs, collating information about known and anticipated events in the external environment, keeping track of what ambulances are doing, where they are located, and of all new calls for the sector. The control teams actively seek new information, pushing updates they receive to each other through the allocator. Allocators in particular, exhibit a special ability to monitor what goes on around them and neighbouring sector desks using 'control ears', or cocktail party effect. They listen for important cues which provide them with information such as transient states of ambulance availability. They attend to job status information such as new calls on the computer screen, or the way in which the paper tickets are placed in the allocators box or on the desk. Such placements carry special meanings about what an ambulance is doing or about to do. The task of maintaining SA is complicated by the fact that information arrives in incomplete units, is of uncertain reliability, interleaved between information about other incidents, is from different sources such as calls from the public, on-scene reports, and over a period of time. This is particularly difficult during the start of a major incident when the workload is suddenly very high as the allocator has to ensure that routine operations continue satisfactorily while attending to the demands of the new major incident.
The Wickens-Endsley Framework
While Endsley (1995) describes three levels of SA, she does not distinguish, as Wickens (2000) does, between the SA in the task, system and environment. Combining the two perspectives on SA we create the framework shown in Table 1 . Categorising our findings within this framework, we find that during major incidents, much of the effort appears directed towards keeping awareness of the 'task', i.e. what other jobs are on-going and overall sector demands, and its implications for the 'environment', i.e. what events have occurred and anticipating what might happen next. During routine operations, the focus appears more on 'system' issues of knowing where the ambulances are, what they are doing and therefore how to co-ordinate the efforts of the 'system' as a whole. In practice, allocators have to interleave their attention between these areas. Designing systems to support such interleaving will present significant challenges.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we have described SA in EMD, and how maintaining SA in such a complex environment is demanding. Allocators develop a "picture in the head" of the overall situation as a result of their developing and maintaining SA. Despite employing what appears as an efficient information handling strategy, the information hub appears to breach some capacity limit during heavy workload periods causing dispatch performance to deteriorate significantly. It is envisaged that by understanding what the more pressing demands are, better systems can be designed to facilitate the integration of information received over time, different sources, and different modalities. Design guidelines have been developed and their evaluation is the focus of future work in this area.
